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ABSTRACT: The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and 
non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to 
examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our 
general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of ap-
plication, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique 
and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. 
Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the relation between 
the two terms of the entanglement as resulting from the satisfaction of a previ-
ously applied moral function. This is what I call a “Three-Fold Model”.
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Introduction
The approach I shall be taking here can be said to move from question-
ing how a particular case of conceptual use fits into the rule-following 
considerations to figuring out how our understanding of the latter may 
be affected by considering the peculiarities of the former. Reflection 
on what could be a proper account of the rule-guided use of thick ethical 
concepts invites consideration of what I shall call a Three-Fold Model of 
conceptual explanation. The peculiarity of this and similar cases, in turn, 
suggests the existence of significant differences in what we do when fol-
lowing rules.
The paper is correspondingly divided in two parts. In the first part, 
the question I am concerned with is how to give a proper account of the 
rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts. I will explore the possibility 
of giving an alternative explanation to the available realist and non-cog-
nitivist ones. To pave the way to this proposal, I will first focus on some 
102 Prolegomena 10 (1) 2011
relevant aspects of McDowell’s (1981/1998) critique of the non-cognitiv-
ist disentangled model and show that McDowell’s success in proving the 
inadequacy of the non-cognitivists’ explanation is not enough to refute the 
very possibility of disentangled accounts. However, disentanglement in 
itself cannot explain the required non-arbitrary and non-subjective nature 
of the connection between the evaluated and the evaluation and McDow-
ell is, to that extent, right. We, therefore, seem to need an account that 
explains this connection without dismissing its cognitive character. My 
aim is to show that my proposal could deliver the needed account.
The second part of the paper studies the implications of the proposed 
model and the understanding of the rule-guided use of thick ethical con-
cepts it involves and suggests the need of case-sensitive studies of what 
we are each time doing in following rules.
First Part: The Case of Ethics
1. Background
Contemporary moral realism does not seem conceivable without the ap-
peal to thick ethical concepts and the support of the entanglement thesis. 
Much of the recent meta-ethical discussion has therefore focused around 
these concepts, whose peculiarity, as opposed to mere abstract or thin 
evaluative ones like “good” or “should”, consists of their being both 
descriptive and evaluative. Among those concepts would be ones such 
as “cruel”, “lying”, “stealing”, “generous”, “pious” or “chaste”. The al-
leged impossibility to tell apart the moral evaluation from the described 
behaviour in most cases would support the claim that what is being sorted 
out by these concepts is a corresponding value-laden property. That is, 
if the concept applies, if we agree that it is rightly applied to this person 
or its behaviour – and if we know how to use the concept we will know 
at least in some cases that it does – then it is an ontological fact we can 
rely on that this person or behaviour is morally condemnable (at least 
it would be so by those thick ethical concepts that include a moral con-
demnation). It is not merely the way we judge such behaviour but the way 
things are and can be registered as being from a well-instructed, concep-
tually aware human perspective, or so the realist claims.
The topic has been much discussed in recent literature, so I will 
just give a short reconstruction of the main problem and focus on aspects 
of the discussion of rule-following that, with some relevant exceptions,1 
have not been very much considered. In what follows, I will be appealing 
1 See Lang (2001).
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to John McDowell’s (1998) discussion of this subject in his “Non-Cogni-
tivism and Rule-Following”.
2. McDowell’s Non-Cognitivism Critique
McDowell’s critique in the referred paper, though targeted primarily 
against non-cognitivists, has wider reaching aspirations. It attempts to 
show the incompatibility of disentangled accounts of thick ethical con-
cepts altogether with an adequate explanation of their rule-guided use. 
My first task will be to see how successful McDowell is in this more 
ambitious objective.
According to non-cognitivists, such as Blackburn (1981), thick ethi-
cal terms, far from registering some value-laden properties of the world, 
as realists defend, result out of the projection of our own evaluative 
reactions upon value-neutral properties. It is actually some such property 
that the concept is registering and what constitutes its cognitive content; 
the evaluative being some added non-cognitive, affective extra, express-
ing our likes and dislikes.
McDowell’s aim is to prove the implausibility of this non-cognitivist 
explanation wrong, together with its utter incompatibility with any proper 
account of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts. If at all feasible, 
the non-cognitivists’ disentangled attempt to give such an account would 
fall under Wittgenstein’s rejected picture of “rules as rails” (McDowell 
1998: 203–212). Non-cognitivists tend to believe that for each language 
practice there must be some aspect of a language-independent world we 
are each time referring to. Conceptual application would be a matter of 
following pre-existent tracks reality would have laid in advance. Accord-
ing to McDowell, the fear is that if there are no reality constraints to our 
language practices, as constructivists on the opposite side claim, then any-
thing goes. There would be no reason why these practices are one way 
rather than another. So we tend to believe that finding some such external 
support is the only way to justify them. This attitude non-cognitivist would 
share with positions such as Platonism and metaphysical realism. The at-
tractiveness of these positions would reside in the unattractiveness of the 
alternative. We tend to embrace them as a reaction to the understandable 
“vertigo” we experience when facing the possible lack of a justification 
for our linguistic practices in some corresponding language independent 
reality, so McDowell.
Instead of insisting on the necessity of some genuine connection 
with an outer world, we should, McDowell (1998: 211) claims, learn to 
live with this vertigo and come to see that nothing is lost. The constraints 
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and necessities of our language practices are not to be found in some 
background reality but in ourselves. There are no given models for our 
conceptual uses, no ready-made world that requires corresponding con-
ceptualizations, but just our own common ways of making sense of the 
world: our own reactions, ways of finding things similar or dissimilar, 
disgusting, funny etc. (206). It is these common capacities that allow us 
to be in tune with each other and upon which linguistic constraints are 
based. McDowell’s realism should allow us to see that being aware 
of the groundlessness of our language practices does not mean losing 
touch with reality, but rather coming to realize what our reality is all 
about. The point is not that different linguistic practices would express 
different ways of our relation to each other and reality. Rather, McDow-
ell’s claim is that we cannot step out of our linguistic practices and try 
to encipher in each case how our language relates to reality and what 
our contribution is. There is no such a neutral point of view from which 
to do that. All our linguistic discourses are at the same level in that sense. 
They and the corresponding knowledge baggage constitute what we call 
reality, an ontological middle ground onto which we can fearlessly step, a 
factual ground we can safely rely on.
Non-cognitivists’ disentangled explanations of thick ethical concepts 
are for McDowell, on the contrary, an example in the above fashion of the 
search for some genuine substrate of (value-neutral) features that supports 
and guides conceptual application. So, his main objective is to show that 
no such model for thick ethical concepts could actually work.
To this purpose McDowell (202–217) argues in the following way: if 
non-cognitivists are to give any consistent account of the rule-guided 
use of thick ethical concepts, they must be able to tell by each concept 
which is the common value-neutral feature we are consistently reacting 
to. Otherwise, they could not explain how we know in which cases the 
concept is to be applied. But, unfortunately, this is not a requirement that 
they could hopefully meet. Since, in the abstraction of evaluative con-
siderations, we would mostly not be able to tell what all cases falling 
under a thick ethical concept have in common. In McDowell’s words, 
such items “need not form a kind” recognizable as such. The reasons 
why they belong together would be precisely those reasons that are left 
out of the non-cognitivist account: those regarding the evaluative appre-
ciations and sensibility of the language users.
We will see this argument in some more detail but, to start with, 
there are actually two different assertions McDowell can be seen as 
making here: what I will call the Generation Argument (GA) and the 
Application Argument (AA).
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   (i) (GA): It should make no sense whatsoever to pick out a value-
neutral class equivalent to that picked out by the thick ethical 
concept without taking into account such evaluative considera-
tions.
(ii) (AA): It should not be possible to distinguish value-neutral 
common features among the members of the extension of a thick 
concept once the class is constituted.
McDowell actually wants to assert both (i) and (ii), but they do not 
necessarily have to go together.
2.1. McDowell’s Argument for (AA)
The argument for (AA) says that the class of individuals, actions or what-
ever that belongs to the extension of a thick ethical concept needn’t have 
any “shape” if we leave out the evaluative concerns. Given a list, we could 
not tell what they all have in common.
However long a list of items we give to which the supervening term 
applies, described in terms of the level supervened upon, there may be no 
way, expressible at the level supervened upon, of grouping just such items 
together. Hence there need be no possibility of mastery, in a way that would 
enable one to go on to new cases, a term which is to function at the level 
supervened upon, but which is to group together exactly the items to which 
competent speakers would apply the supervening term. Understanding why 
just those things belong together may essentially require understanding the 
supervening term. (McDowell 1998: 202)
The point is that such items needn’t have anything in common at the level 
supervened upon. That is also the reason why the possibility envisaged by 
(AA) is not plausible. If they didn’t have anything in common we could 
not sort out such a set (at the level supervened upon) a posteriori either.
I believe the argument reaches non-cognitivists or projectivists, such 
as Blackburn (1981), who would need to claim that it is at some such di-
rectly apprehensible level that we are to find the common features we 
are responding to. The attempt to see the guiding criteria for concep-
tual application in our own reactions, as Blackburn by way of comparison 
with the case of funny also suggests, does not seem plausible. We may 
have positive and negative reactions (Boos! and Hurrays!) to all kind of 
situations, but how should we know which thick concept C1, C2, or C3 
to apply? Our reactions are the same, one to all positive and another to 
all negative cases. Unlike the comic case, where there may be no more 
than gradations in the intensity of the comic reaction (amusing, funny, 
hilarious, etc), here we are dealing with a plurality of thick concepts 
whose difference seems to lie somewhere else, and we do need some cri-
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teria for the application of each one of them. Therefore, McDowell would 
be right in demanding that if a consistent, rule-guided application of these 
concepts on non-cognitivist terms is to be possible, the criteria must lie 
in the non-evaluative features. The claim that there may be some such 
common features, even if we cannot really tell, as Blackburn has de-
fended, again, would not help much: How should they guide us, then?
However, even if there should be nothing value-neutral in common at 
such a basic level, that is not to say that there couldn’t be anything in com-
mon at some other value-neutral higher order level. In such a perceptual 
way, neither could we recognize what is common to individuals falling un-
der terms such as “Republican” or “Dean”, “tool” or “present”. Our morally 
neutral class may be of such a kind as well, a class sharing some describable 
non-moral features which would not be observable from an external, non-
conceptual perspective. Therefore, to claim that there are no shared morally 
neutral features in the non-cognitivist sense does not show, as McDowell 
wants to defend, that what the thick concept sorts out is some non-detachable 
morally laden property. It has not been shown that there is no “higher order 
morally neutral class” in the sense just considered, we could be separately 
evaluating and, thus, that the moral evaluation need not necessarily pertain, 
as an ontological matter (in McDowell’s sense) to the behaviour being char-
acterized. Since it is precisely the latter that McDowell’s realism wanted and 
needed to prove, this option opens at least a breach in the realist aim.
Acknowledging this possibility we can conclude that (AA) is not 
compulsory and the argument does not necessarily refute disentangled ex-
planations of the sort considered.
Let us consider now a Higher Order Disentangling Defender who 
claims, as we just have, that our morally neutral class is not at a non-con-
ceptual level. He claims that what the members of the extension of a thick 
concept have in common could be a set of conceptually describable non-
moral features that would guide the application of the thick concept. So the 
moral value need play no role in explaining why conceptual application 
in thick cases succeeds. As with many other non-moral concepts, we can 
learn to apply them without necessarily relying in conceptually independ-
ent shared natural features.
2.2. McDowell’s Appeal to (GA) as a Reply
The situation is now the following: The disentangling defender is argu-
ing that there is no reason why there could not be some describable mor-
ally neutral type of behaviour identifiable at a higher order level – that 
guides our application of a thick ethical concept. For example, “someone 
saying something intentionally false” or “a woman having a specific gen-
der role in a society”. Once the class is identified, the value is added 
and the concept applied.
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But now McDowell could counter bringing his GA into play: But 
why at all should we pick up such a class as morally relevant? The higher 
order disentangling proposal would still fail to give an explanation in this 
regard. What is missing is an explanation that meaningfully connects the 
purported class as apt for the moral evaluation.
An apprentice may learn to apply the term but he would not 
understand why such independently discernible behaviours or persons 
are to be called “morally good”. He would be like a child sticking red 
labels on all square things, without making any more sense of this than 
following orders. We seem to need some special reason to fix attention 
on this or that particular behaviour as suitable for qualifying it as good. 
Some explanation of this connection is actually required, something that 
is not registered in the scheme offered by the Higher Order Disentangling 
Proposal. To this extent McDowell would be right.
We have arrived at the following situation: we could defend the pos-
sibility of a (higher order) disentangled account of thick concepts in the 
terms questioned by (AA). We could see how a rule-guided use of thick 
concepts could be explained on such a basis. However, the bond between 
such a class and the moral evaluation is still lacking and the very sorting 
out of such a class as suitable for the moral evaluation is not explained.2
Now, if the relation between the evaluated behaviour and the moral 
evaluation is not supposed to be a causal relation, nor a direct logical 
implication, nor some special capacity of ours to recognize it directly per 
sensibility, how should we understand it? We want to know why this or 
that type of behaviour is to be called “good”. But behaviours may be 
good for satisfying very different purposes: to stay healthy, to satisfy 
oneself, to become accepted in some sect, to placate the gods, the clouds, 
or whatever. What we are looking for is something specific, not just good, 
but morally good. So, our question is now the following:
(i) What makes some kind of behaviour morally good?
Before going any further we have to spell out what we mean with “morally”. 
A standard explanation would be to say that morality has to do with those 
specific relations of men to each other (and their surroundings) that we 
want to expect from them.
Substituting we obtain:
(ii) What makes some type of behaviour good relative to the relation 
of men with each other and their surroundings that we want to 
expect from them?
2 Lang (2001: 203) makes some similar observations in his commentaries on Mc-
Dowell.
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Followers of Kant will conclude, for example, that a behaviour is 
good in the sense of (ii) if its general observance would equally protect 
the preferences (Hare 1963), or the needs and interests of the affected 
(Habermas 1983). But whether or not we accept these particular conclu-
sions, the point is that whichever conclusion we may arrive at, it will 
deliver the function (call it MF) relative to whose fulfilment some mor-
ally neutral behaviour is to be called “morally good”.3 As a result, we may 
conclude in a general and provisional way that
(iii) A behavioural type is morally good if it fulfils a well defined MF.
The important thing here is to see the need for some such function, 
some condition whose satisfaction explains why some behavioural type 
and not another is sorted out as suitable to be considered good in a specific 
moral sense. McDowell’s requirement in (GA) would be so met.
The resulting position importantly differs from non-cognitivism in 
the most significant respects: a) conceptual application here is not de-
pendent upon our causal reactions to the world; rather it is a way of 
sorting out the corresponding type of behaviour and – because we have 
concluded that such behavioural types are to be morally evaluated such 
and so – applying the concept to it, b) the morally neutral type of behav-
iour need not be considered from a non-conceptual perspective and c) 
we have to do with a cognitivist position: there are reasons that explain 
why the moral evaluation applies to the behaviour, reasons that could 
be reconsidered. The position differs clearly, too, from the realist position 
because the moral evaluation does not necessarily pertain to the behav-
iour being considered, and, should we come to a different conclusion 
regarding the satisfaction of MF by the behavioural type, we could al-
ways change or eliminate the bond between both.
3. The Proposal: A Three-Fold Model
3.1. The Binding Engine
This binding function acts as an engine between behavioural types and 
moral evaluation. We have to deal with a function that, working at some 
morally neutral level, yields the moral evaluation as a result:
3 We may need to differentiate here between moral and ethical cases. Some behaviour 
may be good in an ethical sense if it is relative to the specific situation of a given society 
and for the interests of its members; or when we have to do with the regulation of aspects 
of social life that allow different solutions without collision with accepted universal values. 
Some thick concepts may have this more restricted character. If this should be so, it would 
be even more pressing to spell it out in order to identify or dispel apparent disagreements.
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             INPUT                           OUTPUT
   (I) Behavioural type input b  →         →  Evaluative output MV
and conceptual application of C to all cases of type b.
Applying this rule we obtain: a specific behaviour b1 fulfils the moral 
function, therefore the moral value and concept can be applied to all cases 
of such a type b1
(1) b1 fulfils MF
(2) MV(b1)
(3) C 1(b1)
However, by our rule-guided application of the so achieved moral 
concepts the rule we follow is a simpler derived one such as:
(II) Behavioural input b1 (assumed MV) → C1 (b1)
Because it has already been proved that behavioural type b1 fulfils the 
MF, it is now a priori that whichever token falls under type b1, it has a 
given MV. By this more simple rule it remains implicitly assumed that 
MF is fulfilled and therefore the MV applies.
   (I) Specifies the general rule through which the bond between the 
behavioural type and the moral evaluation is made that will be 
unified in a corresponding thick ethical concept. (1)–(3) specify 
how this general rule applies to particular cases. It should 
be noted, however, that the corresponding behavioural types are 
sorted out from the perspective of their satisfaction of MF. That 
is, because some given behaviour fulfils MF we conclude that 
all those of the same type should receive the same evaluation.
(II) Specifies the rule followed in applying the concept. This ap-
plication would succeed on a disentangled basis in the sense 
questioned by (AA). It is the presence of a token of b
1
 that will 
give rise to the application of the thick concept, the fulfilment 
of the moral evaluation being simply assumed thereby.
To be sure, the conclusion is not that those characteristics these be-
haviours have in common is their fulfilment of the moral function. This 
would be common to all moral behaviours and would not allow us to 
know which specific thick concept to apply in each case. What the mem-
bers of the extension of a thick concept would have in common is their 







etc.) that fulfils the moral function and are for that reason suitable for the 
moral evaluation.
MF
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Second Part: 
The Three-Fold Model and its Implications
The presented model is what I call a “three-fold model”. It attempts to 
give a more satisfactory disentangled explanation of thick ethical con-
cepts and their rule-guided use, one that could respond to McDowell’s 
challenge. This attempt required explaining the non-arbitrary bond between 
the evaluated behavioural pattern and the moral evaluation. To such a pur-
pose I concluded that there is some function that, when fulfilled by some 
type of behaviour, qualifies it as morally good. So the content we are 
dealing with is established by some operation that assigns, by each 
ongoing input, a given output. Thick ethical concepts result out of syn-
thesizing some such result into a concept.
This would be our case, so how should we understand it? It seems to 
me that, when it comes to the form the articulation of the rule takes, we 
are dealing with a complex case. The peculiarity of our case relies on the 
fact that here we apply the rule in virtue of a pattern whose very suit-
ability for the evaluation and thus conceptual application is dependent 
upon its proved fulfilment of a previous procedure. And this has impor-
tant consequences. Should there be an error in our calculations working 
out such a procedure, the conceptual rule that ties the moral evaluation 
to the pattern would have to be withdrawn and with it all the truths and 
presumed facts made previously on its behalf. So, the simple rule we do 
follow must be considered derived4 and provisional, or at least subject to 
proof. No early truth or facts should be presumed on its behalf.
Now, if this is the situation, what is the relation between the criteria 
of application of the concept and the correctness of corresponding state-
ments? As it appears now, we would have to say that:
Mastery of the simple MP rule and its proper application guarantees 
neither the truth nor the correctness in what is said.
That is, even if our best judgements – concerning whether or not we 
have to deal with the pattern on whose behalf we apply the evaluative 
concept – should be determinant in order to establish the correctness 
of the statement, what they state, what has been proved, is that a given 
token falls under the general (conceptually condensed) law. And, as our 
calculations in the determination of the conceptual rule could go wrong, 
so far our judgements do not necessarily determine the truth of the as-
serted content.
4 I have lately found support for these conclusions in Boghossian’s idea of condi-
tionalised concepts in his (2003). I am working on the relation of my conclusions to his 
proposal but this cannot yet be included here.
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If this is right, we should not step so fearlessly upon McDowell’s mid-
dle-ground “reality”, as it may reveal thinner ice than hypothesized.
To put it otherwise, attending to a model such as the 3FM presented:
a) shows that the patterns on whose basis we actually follow and 
apply some concepts are decisive neither for establishing the truth 
nor the correctness of what is being said on their behalf;
b) warns, therefore, against a too hasty identification of proper use 
of conceptual conventions with truth or correctness of what is said 
and against speaking of corresponding facts in such cases.
This is not to say that our statement may be wrong because truth 
outruns our epistemic justifications; we may be completely right (true) 
in our proof that a given item qualifies undoubtedly as a case of the 
law. What we haven’t proved in applying the concept is that what the 
law says is right about them. This we simply assume on conceptual ap-
plication. Mastery of conceptual application is, therefore, just a guarantee 
for doing the first right, but not the second. So maybe we should say that 
the facts stated are simply facts about truly falling under a law, rather than 
necessarily facts about truly being morally wrong, say. And, because this 
may be so by these concepts and others (many scientific concepts surely 
respond to this or similar models, too), it is our duty to reconstruct the 
path that connects the contents of our concepts with the patterns on whose 
behalf they are applied. At least we should if we are to know what we are 
doing each time in asserting them.
To finish with, what is the import of these conclusions to the rule-
following considerations? On the one hand, we are confronted with 
the phenomena of following derived rules, rules whose rightness is 
dependent upon the rightness of conceptual content itself. This has, for 
its part, consequences relative to what we are doing in asserting the 
rightness of conceptual applications. There may be relevant differences 
in this respect between different kinds of concepts. We can thus conclude 
that there are different things we do in following rules, different things we 
assert as right in applying them and, therefore, case specific considera-
tions are called for.
Final Remarks
It should be noted that the model presented for the ethical case could be 
applied at higher order levels. That is, it could be applied to some already 
evaluative characterized behaviour, whose suitability for moral evalua-
tion, and hence its satisfaction of MF, we would now question. For 
example, some behaviour whose characterization includes it being disin-
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terested could become a candidate for further moral evaluation through its 
fulfilment of MF. The significant contrast is here made between a previ-
ous characterization and a newly introduced evaluation whose relation 
with the former must be explained and could be modified. This way we 
can accommodate the claim that some thick ethical concepts base them-
selves on other thick concepts, without thereby having to accept that there 
should be no possible detachment of the attributed moral evaluation 
and the previously characterized behaviour. We may find out, for exam-
ple, that the such and so disinterested behaviour, were it to be generally 
practiced, would have the most negative effects on those affected by it.
This surely adds further complexity when trying to assess the right-
ness of our assertions in applying the newly derived thick ethical concept 
through our procedure, as the truth of the assertion would now be de-
pendent on the rightness of the first thick characterization and then of the 
second. However, the danger is not that of relying on the objectivity of 
some such characterizations, but in thinking the connections made are 
irremovable and not subject to review when it should be necessary.
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